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TAX-FREE SECURITY: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CUSTOMER DEPOSITS AFTER Commissioner v. Indianapolis
Power & Light Co., 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990).
Abstract" In Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., the Supreme Court held
that a taxpayer receiving a customer deposit to secure future payment for goods or services
may exclude that deposit from income if the taxpayer obligates itself to refund the deposit
and if the customer retains the right to cancel service at any time. Because these condi-
tions characterize virtually all security deposits, the Court's rule will allow taxpayers to
exclude most security deposits from income. This Note examines the Court's decision and
suggests that the Court's rule should not be extended to any situation where either the
obligation to refund the deposit is not imposed by law or the customer contracts to
purchase future goods or services. This restriction will prevent taxpayers from taking
advantage of the rule to avoid federal income tax.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that all income, from whatever
source derived, shall be included in the taxpayer's gross income for the
taxable year.1 However, when a taxpayer receives money subject to
the taxpayer's consensual obligation to repay, as with a loan, courts
have held that the money need not be reported as income because the
economic benefit of the receipt is offset by the obligation to repay.2
Because there is no increase in the taxpayer's net wealth, there is no
income.3 These rules become difficult to apply when the taxpayer who
receives the money and promises to repay is also a seller of goods or
services and, the "lender" is the buyer of those goods or services. In
this situation, it is unclear whether the money is a loan or an advance
payment for the goods or services. This issue arises in cases involving
customer security deposits required by a utility to assure prompt pay-
ment for service.
Frequently, a utility requires a new customer, or one whose credit is
suspect, to make a deposit in some amount greater than the customer's
estimated monthly bill before the utility will provide service. This
deposit is held by the utility until either the customer establishes good
credit by paying all bills promptly for a specified period of time, or
until the customer fails to pay his or her bills, in which case the utility
keeps the deposit and applies it against the customer's outstanding
charges. For federal income tax purposes, the issue is whether the
deposit represents an advance payment for utility services, and is thus
1. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1990).
2. Eg., Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) ('When a taxpayer receives a loan,
he incurs an obligation to repay that loan at some future date. Because of this obligation, the
loan proceeds do not qualify as income to the taxpayer.").
3. See B. BITrKER & L. LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs
16.1 at 6-2 (2d ed. 1989).
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income, or whether the deposit may be excluded from income by the
utility until its obligation to repay the deposit to the customer disap-
pears, as if it were a loan.
In Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (IPL 111), 4 the
United States Supreme Court held that a deposit may be excluded
from income if it is held subject to an express obligation to repay and if
the customer has made no commitment to purchase services. The
Court said that in such situations the taxpayer has no guarantee of
being allowed to keep the money, so the deposit should be treated like
a loan.
This Note analyzes the Court's opinion in IPL III, explains how the
decision changes previous deposit law, and, finally, urges that future
courts restrict the IPL III rule to cases where there is a clear obliga-
tion to repay the deposit and where the customer has made no com-
mitment to purchase services. This restriction will prevent the rule
from frustrating federal income tax law.
I. TRADITIONAL AND NEW APPROACHES TO DEPOSIT
TAXATION
To determine whether a security deposit is taxable, the initial
inquiry is whether the taxpayer has received "income." Income is
defined generally in section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code),
and courts have elaborated on that definition in cases involving both
landlord-tenant deposits and other deposits.
A. The Statutory Definition of Income and the Necessity of an
Accession to Wealth
The Code defines gross income as all income from whatever source
derived.5 In interpreting the Code's definition of income, the Supreme
Court has frequently stated that Congress used this language to exert
the full measure of its taxing power.6 Nevertheless, not every eco-
nomic benefit to the taxpayer will result in income. Courts have held
that income requires, at a minimum, the presence of two elements: an
accession to the taxpayer's wealth7 and an event by which that acces-
sion is realized by the taxpayer.8
4. 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990), aff'g 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988) (IPL II), aff'g 88 T.C. 964
(1987) (IPL I).
5. I.R.C. § 61(a).
6. E.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
7. This concept is implicit in section 61's reference to "income," "gains," and other items that
would increase a taxpayer's wealth. See I.R.C. § 61.
8. See B. BITrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 3, 115.2, at 5-17.
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Courts have generally considered all funds received to be taxable
accessions to wealth unless the receipt of the funds is accompanied by
an obligation to repay those funds. In James v. United States,9 the
Court held that embezzled funds were income to the embezzler. 10 The
Court said that a taxpayer who receives funds without also agreeing to
repay the funds has received income. 11 Even though James was under
an unqualified duty to repay the money to his employer, the Court
considered the embezzled money to be income because there was no
consensual agreement to repay it.12
In contrast, no iaxable accession to wealth exists when a taxpayer
accepts money but contemporaneously incurs a consensual obligation
to repay that money, as with a loan. For example, in Commissioner v.
Tufts,13 the Court held that the receipt of a mortgage loan did not
affect the taxpayer's income tax liability. No net accession to the tax-
payer's wealth occurred because the increase in the taxpayer's wealth
caused by the loan was offset by the obligation to repay the loan. 14
B. The Analytical Struggle
Traditional analysis of security deposit taxability, which derived
from landlord-tenant law, also focused on whether a deposit repre-
sented an accession to the taxpayer's wealth. Until IPL 111, landlord-
tenant law provided the analytical framework used to determine the
taxability of deposits.
L Landlord-Tenant Law: Advance Rent and "True" Security
Deposits
Questions of security deposit taxability arise most frequently in the
landlord-tenant context. Generally, payments made pursuant to a
lease of property are divided into two categories: those that serve as
advance payments of rent, and those that secure performance of cove-
nants under the lease. A deposit that is an advance payment of rent is
income when received, regardless of whether the taxpayer uses a
9. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
10. James, a union official, embezzled in excess of $738,000 over four years from his union
employer and an insurance company with which the union did business. James did not report
this amount as income during the taxable years at issue. Id at 214.
11. Id at 219.
12. Id. The Court reversed the conviction for tax fraud, however, because the element of
willful evasion of federal income tax was not proven. Id at 221-22.
13. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
14. Id. at 307.
15. Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1949); Clinton Hotel Realty
Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968, 969 (5th Cir. 1942). A corollary to this rule is that
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cash or accrual method 16 of accounting.17  Conversely, a refundable
deposit that secures the landlord against the tenant's breach of the
lease is not income upon receipt. 18
The conventional explanation of the non-taxation of deposits to
secure property is that the deposits will never be an accession to the
taxpayer's wealth. Even if the taxpayer keeps all or part of a deposit
as the result of property damage, this is compensation for his loss and
does not increase the taxpayer's net worth. 9 In contrast, an advance
payment is an accession to the taxpayer's wealth because it is not offset
by any related deduction.
In cases where the purpose of a deposit was unclear because it could
potentially have secured both kinds of items, courts applied a primary-
purpose test.2 ° Courts determined whether the deposit was primarily
intended to secure an income-producing or nonincome-producing
item2 and categorized the deposit respectively as an advance payment
or a security deposit. Despite the apparent simplicity of this test,
courts often had difficulty drawing the line between security deposits
and advance payments.22
deposits that secure the payment of rent are considered advance payments of rent. E.g., J. & E.
Enters. v. Commissioner, 1967 T.C.M. (P-H) 67,191.
16. Under the cash method of accounting, all items that constitute gross income (whether in
the form of cash, property, or services) are included for the taxable year in which they are
actually or constructively received. Treas. Reg. § 1.4 4 6-1(c)(i) (as amended in 1987).
In contrast, under accrual-method accounting, income is included for the taxable year when
all the events have occurred that fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can
be determined with reasonable accuracy, whether or not payment has been received. Id. § 1.446-
l(c)(ii).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b) (1957).
18. Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47, 48 (5th Cir. 1943); Gilken Corp. v.
Commissioner, 10 T.C. 445, 451 (1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949).
19. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1162, 1167 n.9 (1988) (IPL
II), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990). A taxpayer may keep only that amount of a security deposit
that equals the amount of his loss. E.g., Boral v. Caldwell, 223 Cal. App. 2d 157, 35 Cal. Rptr.
689, 692 (1963). Although the taxpayer will have to declare that portion of the deposit kept as
income in the year in which his obligation to repay disappears, the income will be offset by a
mirror deduction in the amount of the repair necessitated by the damage to the property.
Therefore, there will be no enhancement of the taxpayer's net wealth.
20. See, e.g., Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1944);
Gilken, 10 T.C. at 454.
21. As used in this Note, the term "income-producing item" means an item that will be
income when received (such as rent). A "nonincome-producing item" is one that will not
generate net income (such as a covenant securing against property damage). See supra note 19
and accompanying text.
22. For example, in Clinton Hotel Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942), the
court examined a deposit that secured both payment of rent and performance of other non-rental
covenants and was to be applied to the rent for the last year of the lease. The court held the
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2. Non-Lease Security Deposits: The Problem of Classification
When traditional deposit analysis is applied to deposits outside the
landlord-tenant context, the deposits do not fit neatly into either the
advance-payment-of-fixed-rent category or the security-for-property
category. The reason is that most non-lease deposits are designed to
secure payment for an undetermined quantity of goods or services to
be provided in the future. A deposit required by a utility company to
assure prompt payment of bills is a case in point. Although the
deposit secures an income-producing item (payment for goods or serv-
ices), the deposit is not truly akin to an advance payment because the
customer is not obligated to buy any services from the utility, the
deposit will rarely match any fixed amount owed the utility, and the
customer can generally be assured of a refund by paying his or her
bills on time. Nor is the deposit truly security for property interests
because there are relatively few nonincome-producing items that are
the subject of covenants in such agreements.23 Thus, what exists in
most non-lease cases is a hybrid-security for an income-producing
item-and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts have
struggled in their attempts to pigeonhole this hybrid into either con-
ventional category.
3. Solutions Offered
Prior to IPL II, the IRS and the courts reached differing conclu-
sions about the taxability of customer deposits.
a. The IRS Answer
The IRS ruled that a deposit to guarantee a customer's payment of
an amount owed a utility should be taxable upon receipt.2' The IRS
so held when considering whether deposits required of new customers
by a water company to guarantee payment for water were income.25
The IRS relied on the landlord-tenant principle that a deposit
intended primarily to secure the payment of rent is considered
deposit did not constitute income because it was "obvious that there were many things to which
[the deposit] might become applicable besides" the last year's rent. Id. at 970.
Conversely, in Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1949), on facts
nearly identical to Clinton, the court concluded that the deposit was advance rent because it was
to be applied to the rent for the last months of the lease term.
23. An example would be damage to meters. Eg., City Gas Co. of Fla. v. Commissioner,
1984 T.C.M. (P-H) S 84,044, at 84,163 (City Gas III) ("Charges for damage to meters and other
nonincome items did not make up a significant portion of the total final charges.").
24. Rev. Ruling 72-519, 1972-2 C.B. 32.
25. Id. at 32-33.
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advance rent. Apparently construing this to mean that a deposit is
income if it secures an item that will be income when received,26 the
IRS ruled that a deposit to secure future payment for goods should be
considered an advance payment.27
b. The Tax Court Approach
The Tax Court28 usually considered the kind of item a deposit
secured in classifying the deposit, but the court also attached great
weight to the right of the taxpayer to control the ultimate disposition
of the deposit. 29 For example, if a landlord could either apply a
deposit to a tenant's last month's rent or refund the deposit when the
last month's rent was paid, the landlord retained ultimate control over
the deposit.3 ° In such cases, the Tax Court never characterized a
deposit as a security deposit, but rather deemed it an advance payment
of rent.31
Nevertheless, the Tax Court also advocated looking through the
form of a transaction to find its true substance. 32 Thus, when a tax-
payer lacked ultimate control over a deposit in form only, the Tax
Court has found that the deposit was income to the taxpayer upon
receipt.33
c. Other Courts' Approaches
Federal district and circuit courts have been inconsistent in their
treatment of both lease and non-lease deposits. 34 These courts, how-
ever, were generally more willing than the Tax Court to call a deposit
26. See Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 110 S. Ct. 589, 595 n.9 (1990) (IPL
III).
27. Rev. Ruling 72-519, 1972-2 C.B. at 33.
28. The Tax Court (formerly the Board of Tax Appeals) is an Article I court which has only
"deficiency" jurisdiction (apart from some declaratory judgment cases) and so is only available to
a taxpayer who has already paid his tax in full. See generally H. DUBROFF, THE UNITED
STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (1979).
29. See Burke & Friel, Tax Free Security: Reflections on Indianapolis Power and Light, 12
REV. OF TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS 157, 167 (1989).
30. E.g., J. & E. Enters. v. Commissioner, 1967 T.C.M. (P-H) q 67,191.
31. Burke & Friel, supra note 29, at 167.
32. Id. at 162.
33. See, e.g., August v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1165, 1169 (1952) (holding that where lessor
and lessee agreed that lessor would "refund" security deposit over the last nine months of the
lease simultaneously with lessee's payment of rent the transaction was merely a meaningless
exchange of checks and the deposit was actually advance rent). For a more detailed discussion of
August, see infra text accompanying notes 130-33.
34. Burke & Friel, supra note 29, at 173. For a review of the courts' treatment of lease
deposit cases, see id. at 162-69; Prescott, Customer Deposits: Tax-Free Security or Prepaid
Income?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 773, 782-87 (1989).
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taxable income, even when the taxpayer did not have ultimate control
over the deposit's disposition. This was true when the courts believed
that the deposit would eventually be applied as payment for goods or
services."5 Occasionally, the courts applied the rule of substance-over-
form when they viewed a payment as merely a fagade for another
transaction.36
4. The Eleventh and Seventh Circuit Split
The split that existed between the Eleventh and Seventh circuits in
the utility deposit cases prior to IPL III exemplified the confusion
caused by the diverse approaches taken to security deposit analysis.
a. The Eleventh Circuit: City Gas Co. of Florida v. Commissioner
In City Gas Co. of Florida v. Commissioner (City Gas II),37 the Elev-
enth Circuit held that utility deposits were income when received if
the primary purpose of the deposits was to act as a prepayment for
goods or services. 38 The City Gas 11 taxpayers were three Florida gas
companies. 39  All three utilities required new customers to make
deposits to secure payment of all bills for service rendered to the cus-
tomers. 4' The deposits were to be refunded upon termination of ser-
vice after they were applied against any outstanding charges. 41 The
utilities paid four-percent or higher interest on customer deposits.42
Any unclaimed deposits escheated to the state after fifteen years.43
In a previous disposition, the Tax Court had held that the deposits
were not includable in the utilities' income.' 4 Rejecting the primary-
35. See, ag., Van Wagoner v. United States, 368 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that a
"deposit premium" paid at the inception of an insurance policy was an advance payment because
it stood in the place of a regular premium and because there was a high probability the deposit
would eventually be applied to the policy). For a more detailed discussion of Van Wagoner, see
infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
36. See, eg., United States v. Williams, 395 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that a "loan" to
a taxpayer was actually an advance payment under a timber lease). For a more detailed
discussion of Williams, see infra text accompanying notes 113-20.
37. 689 F.2d 943 (1 1th Cir. 1982), rev'g 74 T.C. 386 (1980) (City Gas I). On remand, the Tax
Court applied the Eleventh Circuit's test and held that the deposits were income. 1984 T.C.M.
(P-H) 84,044 (City Gas III).
38. City Gas II, 689 F.2d at 946.
39. Id. at 944.
40. City Gas I, 74 T.C. at 388. The deposit was $15 for a residential customer and an amount
twice the estimated monthly bill for a commercial customer. Id. at 388-89.
41. Id. at 389.
42. Id
43. Id. at 388.
44. Id at 391.
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purpose test4 5 and placing its traditional emphasis on taxpayer control
over the deposit,4 6 the Tax Court held that the deposits were not
advance payments because they were refundable to the customers.4 7
Thus, so long as the utilities did not have control over the ultimate
disposition of the deposits, the Tax Court was willing to treat the
deposits as nontaxable.48
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. 9 Citing previous lease cases and a
revenue ruling,5 ° the court held that tax treatment of the payments
would depend on whether they were primarily intended: (1) to act as a
prepayment for goods or services, or (2) to secure either performance
of nonincome-producing covenants or against damage to property.51
Because the court admitted the possibility of only these two categories,
the Eleventh Circuit's primary-purpose test included in income all
deposits to secure income-producing items. 2
On remand, the Tax Court applied the primary-purpose test and
held that the deposits' primary purpose was to secure payment for
gas. 53 The deposits were, therefore, taxable upon receipt as advance
payments. 4
b. The Seventh Circuit: Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v.
Commissioner
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit in City Gas i, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner (IPL II)51
found that utility deposits were not income if they were primarily
intended to act as security, regardless of whether they secured an
income-producing or nonincome-producing item. 6 As did the utilities
in City Gas I1, Indianapolis Power & Light Company (IPL) required
45. Id. at 394.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
47. City Gas 1, 74 T.C. at 394 ("[T]he full amount of a deposit received by one of [the utilities]
was, unconditionally, subject to refund to the customer. If the refund was not effected, the
amount would ultimately escheat to the State.").
48. Burke & Friel, supra note 29, at 171.
49. City Gas Co. of Fla. v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 943, 950 (11th Cir. 1982) (City Gas 11).
50. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing Revenue Ruling 72-519, 1972-2
C.B. 32).
51. City Gas 11, 689 F.2d at 946.
52. Seago, Recent Cases Focus on When Deposits are Includable in Income, 70 J. TAX'N 38, 38
(1989).
53. City Gas Co. of Fla. v. Commissioner, 1984 T.C.M. (P-H) q 84,044, at 84,162-63 (City
Gas III).
54. Id. at 84,163.
55. 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990).
56. Id. at 1170.
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some of its customers to make deposits to guarantee payment of their
bills. 57 A deposit was refunded if a customer paid all bills promptly
for either nine successive months or ten out of any twelve months,
provided the customer did not make late payments for any two con-
secutive months.58 The utility originally paid three-percent interest on
deposits held at least six months. 9 Later, state law was changed to
require payment of six-percent interest on deposits held over twelve
months.' Unclaimed deposits escheated to the state after seven
years.61
Affirming its position in the initial City Gas decision,62 the Tax
Court held that the deposits were not income because the utility did
not have control over the ultimate disposition of the deposits. 63 The
court noted that the utility did not have a right to decide how the
deposits would be used until the customers failed to pay their bills
promptly and that the utility consistently treated the deposits as
belonging to the customers. 4
The Seventh Circuit affirmed.65 The court, however, applied a dif-
ferent primary-purpose test than did the Eleventh Circuit in City Gas
I1 The Seventh Circuit asked whether the primary purpose of the
deposits was to secure future performance or to serve as an advance
payment of income.16 Thus, the court focused not on the type of item
secured, as did the Eleventh Circuit,67 but on the intent of the parties
regarding the deposit.
In determining whether the deposits' primary purpose was security,
the Seventh Circuit placed special emphasis on IPL's obligation to pay
interest on the deposits.68 The court said that the value of a deposit
57. The utility required about five percent of its customers to make deposits in an amount
equal to twice their estimated monthly bills. The customers were chosen because their credit was
suspect. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 964, 966 (1987) (IPL 1),
afifd, 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), aft'd, 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990).
58. Id. at 968.
59. Id. at 967.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 969.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
63. IPL I 88 T.C. at 977-78.
64. Id.
65. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1162, 1163 (1988) (IPL II),
aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990).
66. Id. at 1170.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
68. Nearly every court that has decided a deposit case has considered the payment of interest
very important in characterizing the deposit as either security or an advance payment. In fact,
the Seventh Circuit went so far as to suggest that this single factor "substantially reconciles the
line of cases addressing the taxability of customer deposits." IPL 11 857 F.2d at 1169 n.11.
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was twofold. First, it gave the recipient the opportunity to generate a
return.69 Second, it saved the recipient at least a portion of the costs
that would arise if the other party defaulted. 7° As the rate of interest
paid by the utility approached the rate it could earn, the return factor
lost its importance and the value of the deposit was more truly secur-
ity.71 The court admitted, however, that in many cases the differential
between the interest rate paid and the probable return would be diffi-
cult to determine.72 The court concluded, therefore, that a reviewing
court would also have to consider other factors to determine the pri-
mary purpose of the customer deposit.
73
Applying this analysis, the court considered both the interest IPL
paid on the deposits74 and the circumstances surrounding the depos-
its. 75 The court concluded that the primary purpose of the deposits
was security. Thus, the deposits were not income.76 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to the IRS to resolve this conflict between the
circuits.77
C. The Supreme Court: Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power &
Light Co.
In Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (IPL II),71 the
Supreme Court did not limit its analysis of IPL's deposits to catego-
rizing them as either advance payments for goods or services or secur-
ity for a property interest. Nor did the Court attempt to discern the
deposits' primary purpose. Instead, the Court examined the tax-
payer's dominion over the deposits to determine whether they were
income. For a deposit to be taxable income, the Court said the tax-
payer must have complete dominion over the deposit.79 The Court
illustrated what it meant by "complete dominion" by comparing a
69. Id. at 1168.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1168-69.
72. Id. at 1170 n.12.
73. Id.
74. IPL paid three- to six-percent interest on the deposits during the period in question. See
supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
75. The Tax Court found that IPL did not have control over the deposits because the
customers could control the timing of the refunds and that IPL did not intend for the deposits to
serve as advance payments. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 964,
977-78 (1987) (IPL I), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990).
76. IPL II, 857 F.2d at 1170.
77. Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 110 S. Ct. 589, 592 (1990) (IPL III).
78. 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990).
79. Id. at 593 ("The key is whether the taxpayer has some guarantee that he will be allowed
to keep the money.").
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loan to an advance payment. A taxpayer who receives a loan has no
guarantee of keeping the funds because of the obligation to repay.8"
Thus, the taxpayer does not have complete dominion over a loan. In
contrast, a taxpayer who receives an advance payment is assured of
keeping the money, so long as the taxpayer fulfills its contractual obli-
gation.8" Therefore, the taxpayer has complete dominion over an
advance payment.
IPL had no assurance that it would keep its deposits because its
customers had made no commitment to buy electricity in the future.
A customer could terminate service the day after a deposit was made
and ask for a refund.82 Moreover, even if the customer used electric-
ity, IPL was obligated to repay the deposit when the customer estab-
lished creditwothiness8 3 The customer was assured of a refund
simply by paying the bills in a timely fashion. As a result, IPL lacked
ultimate control over the deposits and the deposits more nearly resem-
bled loans than advance payments.84 IPL, therefore, did not have the
complete dominion over the deposits necessary to justify present inclu-
sion in income.8"
The Court said that whether a deposit is more like a loan or an
advance payment must be determined by looking to the relative rights
of the parties at the time the deposit was made.86 The Court rejected
the Commissioner's argument that in substance the deposits were
advance payments because the majority of customers chose to apply
the payments to their electric bills.87 The Court said that the utility's
repayment of a deposit to a customer and the customer's subsequent
decision to apply the repayment to his or her utility bill were two dis-
crete transactions that could not be combined to produce a different
tax result.8
80. Idk at 592-93.
81. Id. at 594.
82. Ide at 594 n.6.
83. Id. at 593.
84. Id. at 595.
85. Id.
86. Id at 594-95.
87. The utility kept 57.7% to 69% of its deposits during the years in question. Indianapolis
Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 964, 969 (1987) (IPL I), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1162 (7th
Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990).
88. IPL Iii, 110 S. Ct. at 594 n.8. To illustrate why the exchange-of-checks operation more
accurately reflected the economic substance of the transaction, the Court hypothesized a loan
between two parties involved in an ongoing commercial relationship:
At the time the loan falls due, the lender may decide to apply the money owed him to the
purchase of goods or services rather than to accept repayment in cash. But this decision
does not mean that the loan, when made, was an advance payment after all. The lender in
effect has taken repayment of his money... and has chosen to use the proceeds for the
277
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The Court also disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that
payment of interest on deposits was an important factor in character-
izing those deposits.8 9 The Court pointed out that payment of interest
has little to do with the degree of taxpayer control. For example, the
Court reasoned that even though banks pay interest on their custom-
ers' deposits, the deposits are not income.9" The Court concluded,
therefore, that interest is of no help in determining whether a taxpayer
has dominion over a deposit.91
II. ANALYSIS OF COMMISSIONER v. INDIANAPOLIS
POWER & LIGHT CO.
This Note examines the effects of IPL III and how IPL III should
be applied in future cases. Part A explores the effect that IPL III will
have on non-lease deposit law. The discussion focuses on the switch
from the primary-purpose test to the complete dominion test and on
how IPL III overrules prior deposit law. Part B urges that the IPL III
rule be applied only to cases factually similar to IPL II. This Note
suggests two methods by which courts can avoid misapplication of
IPL III in cases where the results would be inconsistent with federal
income tax law.
A. Effect of Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. on
Non-Lease Deposit Law
1. Primary Purpose Test Discarded
After IPL III, courts need not determine the primary purpose of a
non-lease deposit or the type of item secured by the deposit. The only
consideration is the taxpayer's control over the deposit, no matter
what the deposit is intended to secure. The IPL III approach is pref-
erable to prior court treatment of non-lease deposits because prior
analysis was unsuited for non-lease deposit cases.
The primary-purpose test was difficult to apply and produced con-
trary results in cases with similar facts. Using the primary-purpose
test, courts often found it impossible to determine from an agreement
just what a deposit was intended to secure. 92 As a result, the outcome
purchase of goods from the borrower .... It is this element of choice that distinguishes an
advance payment from a loan.
Id. at 594-95.
89. Id. at 593.
90. Id. at 593-94.
91. Id. at 594.
92. In Oak Indus. v. Commissioner, 1987 T.C.M. (P-H) 87,065, at 87,306, the court said,
"[tjhere is no indication on the [cable TV] subscription agreement as to which of [the
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turned on the court's artificial reading of the relative weight the parties
gave to their "intentions. '93 The test also yielded inconsistent results
in cases with similar facts because courts disagreed over what the pri-
mary-purpose test was.94 Most importantly, the primary-purpose test
and its implicit reliance on the advance payment/security-for-property
distinction served only to obscure the question whether "security" for
future income is income when received.95 For these reasons, the
Supreme Court correctly rejected both the lease-deposit analysis and
the primary-purpose test.
2. Complete Dominion Test Adopted
The IPL III decision marks the beginning of the application of com-
plete dominion analysis to security deposit cases. In IPL II, the util-
ity's dominion over its deposits was determined in light of the
agreement of the parties at the time the deposits were made. Two
aspects of the security deposits demonstrated a lack of dominion.
First, the utility held the deposits subject to an express obligation to
repay.9 6 Second, IPL's customers made no commitment to purchase
services in the future.9 7 According to the second requirement of the
Court's test, a taxpayer that receives a deposit from a customer but no
commitment to purchase services has not received income. Presum-
ably, a customer must agree to purchase some specific quantity of
goods or services before the customer's deposit can be considered
income. This requirement essentially collapses a complete dominion
inquiry into that of an advance payment. This overrules prior cases in
which courts have found a deposit to be income when received even
though there was no commitment to purchase any services.
The requirement that there be a commitment to purchase services
before a deposit is considered income will drastically narrow the range
of deposits that are income. This effect can be demonstrated by apply-
agreement's] purposes was primary." As a result, the court had to consider other factors to
determine the deposit's primary purpose.
93. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67 (discussing the differences between the Eleventh
and Seventh circuits' primary purpose tests).
95. From an economic point of view, it is unclear why a deposit that will be applied to a
future bill should produce tax results different from a deposit to secure payment of the bill. In
the latter case, the taxpayer will refund the deposit when payment of the bill is received; in
essence this is merely a meaningless exchange of checks. Burke & Friel, supra note 29, at
167-68. But see Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1162, 1167 n.9 (7th
Cir. 1988) (IPL 11) (arguing that in economic substance there is also no distinction between an
advance payment and a deposit to secure property), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990).
96. Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 110 S. Ct. 589, 593 (1990) (IPL II).
97. Id. at 594.
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ing IPL III's dominion test to the factually similar case of Van Wag-
oner v. United States.98 In Van Wagoner, the Fifth Circuit considered
whether commissions retained from "deposit premiums" paid to an
insurance broker at the inception of insurance policies were income.
The exact amount of a premium (and therefore the commission)
would not be known until the end of the period to which the premium
applied.9 9 A deposit was required if the insured had a poor credit rat-
ing."°0 The deposit premium was credited to the insured's account at
the end of the insured period and any excess over what was owed for
the premium was either refunded or, if the policy was renewed,
credited to the new policy. 01 The policies could be cancelled at any
time, in which case the deposits (and commissions) were refunded.'02
The Van Wagoner court held that the deposits were income when
received.' 3 It did not matter to the court that the amount of any one
deposit might exceed the amount ultimately owed by the customer
because service could be cancelled at any time. The court held the
deposits were income because the taxpayer had complete and
unrestricted use of the commissions retained from the deposits and, if
the policy was not cancelled, the deposits would be applied to the pre-
miums. " After IPL III, however, courts will be unable to find that a
taxpayer has dominion over such deposits because the taxpayer's cus-
tomers can cancel service at any time. The deposits, therefore, are no
longer income to the taxpayer.
As the Van Wagoner example demonstrates, using the dominion test
will prevent current taxation of non-lease security deposits in virtually
all cases. This is so for two reasons. First, the IPL III test prohibits a
court from finding complete dominion if there is an obligation to repay
the deposits. Security deposits, however, are by nature refundable
upon the fulfillment of the contractual obligations." 5 Thus, deposits
are almost always held subject to an obligation to repay.10 6 Second,
98. 368 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1966).
99. The policies insured oil drilling rigs and the premiums were based on the amount of use of
the rigs and the areas in which they were operated during the period. Id. at 96.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 98.
104. Id.
105. A security deposit is defined as "[m]oney deposited by tenant with landlord as security
for full and faithful performance by tenant of terms of lease, including damages to premises. It is
refundable unless the tenant has caused damage or injury to the property .... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1217 (5th ed. 1979). In non-lease cases, because the deposit secures payment, the
deposit generally is refundable unless the customer fails to pay his or her bills.
106. No recent case has involved a deposit that was not in some measure refundable.
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the IPL III test prevents a court from finding complete dominion
unless there is a commitment by the customer to purchase some fixed
amount of goods or services from the taxpayer. Outside of the land-
lord-tenant area, however, a customer rarely, if ever, makes a commit-
ment to purchase any fixed amount of goods or services. Thus, with
non-lease deposits, the taxpayer will have no guarantee of keeping the
money and, therefore, will not have complete dominion over the
deposit.
In practice, then, the dominion test operates as a per se rule of
exclusion from income of non-lease security deposits. 10 7 This rule
applies whenever there is an express obligation to repay a deposit cou-
pled with the ability of the customer to cancel service at any time.
Because the deposit recipient in this situation has no guarantee of
keeping the money, this result is consistent with other areas of tax
law1"8 and with the goal of federal income tax law to tax only realized
accessions to wealth. 10 9
B. The Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. Rule
Should be Restricted to "Easy" Cases
IPL III announced a new rule: a'customer deposit held subject to an
obligation to repay coupled with the customer's ability to cancel ser-
vice at any time equals a tax-free security deposit. IPL III was an
"easy" case in which to apply the rule, both because the utility had a
statutory obligation to repay the deposits and because its customers
made no commitment to purchase any electricity. In factually similar
situations the IPL III rule should work well. However, when the obli-
gation to repay is not imposed by law or there is a commitment to
purchase future services, courts should engage in a more searching
scrutiny of the facts and apply the reasoning, but not the form, of the
IPL Ii test to reflect the different substance of the transaction.
107. This is an ironic result considering that the Eleventh Circuit's test had been criticized
because it would always require inclusion in income of deposits held to secure income items.
Eg., Seago, supra note 52, at 38 ("Generally, the taxpayer cannot win if [the Eleventh Circuit's]
primary purpose test is applied because the deposit is intended as security for payment, an
income-producing covenant."). But see Burke & Friel, supra note 29, at 174 (arguing that the
Eleventh Circuit's test better comports with an economic benefit analysis and thereby causes less
distortion of income).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
Washington Law Review
1. A Nominal Obligation to Repay Should Not be Decisive
In IPL 111, the Court's decision was simplified because state law
defined the relations of the utility and its customers. Thus, the Court
could presume that the utility's promise to refund the deposits to its
customers was conclusive of its actual intent. In future cases, how-
ever, courts should avoid relying too heavily on the existence of a
promise to repay. The characterization of a payment as a loan usually
turns on more than a simple obligation to repay. Therefore, when the
rights and obligations of the parties are not prescribed by statute or
regulation, courts should consider the other factors traditionally used
in identifying a loan to determine whether a bona fide obligation to
repay exists.
A loan is money received subject to a contractual obligation to
repay the sum at some future time, with or without an additional sum
for its use."' Although some courts have treated a mere obligation to
repay as adequate justification for excluding deposits from income,11'
most courts consider all of the circumstances surrounding the deposit
in making this determination."' 2 Where the circumstances indicate
that the obligation to repay should be disregarded, courts are willing
to do so.
In United States v. Williams," 3 the taxpayer granted the right to cut
and purchase timber on 6,525 acres of his land for a period of 66
years." 4 The initial price was three dollars per cord.1 5 The grantee
paid $19,575 for the first year, plus made a "loan" to the taxpayer in
the amount of $176,175.' 16 The taxpayer agreed to repay the loan in
annual installments by crediting the installments against the yearly
payments due him for the use of the land and timber." 7 The Fifth
110. E.g., Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976). For federal income tax
purposes, however, interest on a loan will generally be imputed if it is not stated. See I.R.C.
§ 7872 (1990).
111. E.g., Mantell v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1143, 1148 (1952):
However, we cannot conclude therefrom as does the [Commissioner] that the provision for
the repayment of the security deposit to the lessees lacked substance and was in fact a
provision for the prepayment of rent. Such an express provision cannot easily be
disregarded when, as here, the legal rights of the parties, and of third parties also, may be
substantially different depending on whether the clause provides that the deposit is to be
returned to the lessees or applied to the rent of the final period.
112. See John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946); Prescott, supra note 34,
at 801.
113. 395 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1968).
114. Id. at 509.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Circuit held that the loan was an advance payment on the timber con-
tract, citing the well-recognized premise that in federal tax cases the
substance of the transaction, rather than its form, is decisive.118 The
court found that the loan lacked the fundamental characteristics of a
true loan. It was not repayable at a definite date, no promissory note
was ever executed, and the loan and the lease were interdependent-
neither would have been made without the other.1 19 Finally, the court
noted that the total amount paid to the taxpayer exactly matched ten
years' rent under the contract. Therefore, the court held that the loan
was taxable as an advance payment. 20
The Williams court reached a sound result by carefully considering
factors in addition to the obligation to repay. Similarly, in applying
the IPL III rule in future cases when, as in Williams, the validity of
the repayment obligation is unclear, courts should consider the sur-
rounding circumstances in addition to the express promise to repay to
determine whether a deposit is held subject to a genuine obligation to
repay. Circumstances that indicate a valid repayment obligation
include: the existence of a written agreement to refund, 21 a fixed date
for repayment,122 a high likelihood of repayment,123 the deposit's inde-
pendence from other transactions, 124 and the intent of the parties to
enforce repayment. 125 Only if these factors are considered can a court
reconcile the intent of federal income tax laws to tax realized acces-
sions to taxpayers' wealth with the right of taxpayers to exclude from
income receipts held subject to bona fide liabilities.
The IPL III Court anticipated "hard" cases such as Williams when
it said that it was not attempting to devise a test for transactions where
the nature of the parties' bargain is legitimately in dispute.1 26 Thus,
the Court preserved the ability of future courts to find complete
dominion even where the deposit is nominally refundable or where it is
characterized as a loan.
/
118. Id. at 510.
119. Id. at 511.
120. Id.
121. Bain v. Commissioner, 1989 T.C.M. (P-H) %89,310, at 89,1544.
122. Id.
123. Illinois Power Co. v. Commissioner, 792 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir. 1986).
124. Williams, 395 F.2d at 511.
125. Bain, 1989 T.C.M. (P-H) at 89,1544.
126. Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 110 S. Ct. 589, 595 (1990) (IPL II).
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2. An Obligation to Repay Should Yield to a Commitment to
Purchase Services
In IPL 111, the Court could readily hold that the deposits were not
taxable because the utility's customers retained the right to cancel ser-
vice at any time. Thus, IPL had no guarantee that it would keep the
deposits. However, if courts carelessly apply the IPL III rule in cases
where there is both an obligation to repay and a commitment to
purchase services, courts may allow clever taxpayers to circumvent
federal income tax laws.
The question may arise whether a landlord can escape present taxa-
tion by artfully structuring an advance payment of rent as a deposit to
"secure" the future payment of rent. For example, the landlord could
require a refundable deposit in the amount of the last month's rent as
security for payment of the last month's rent. Before IPL II, no case
had gone so far as to suggest that this scheme could successfully avoid
taxation. 127  However, given the IPL II focus on an obligation to
repay, it is plausible that a landlord could structure a contract in this
way, then claim he or she had insufficient dominion over the deposit to
qualify the deposit as advance rent.128 This result would be inconsis-
tent with the goal of taxing realized accessions to wealth and at odds
with well-settled case law. 129
In previous cases, courts have emphasized substance over form and
held that when there is only a meaningless exchange of checks, a
deposit to secure payment of rent should be treated as an advance pay-
ment of rent. In August v. Commissioner,"13 the court held that a
deposit that was to be refunded in ten installments over the last seven
months of a lease was actually advance rent.13 ' The court examined
the circumstances surrounding the repayments, including the facts
that the repayments were to be made just after payments of the last
127. Burke & Friel, supra note 29, at 167.
128. This problem was anticipated by the Commissioner in the Seventh Circuit IPL case. In
that case, the court said:
In its simplest terms, the IRS's argument is that deposits to secure rent must be taxed the
same as advance payments because otherwise lessors desiring the non-tax advantages
associated with advance payments could obtain them and at the same time avoid the
resulting adverse tax consequences by structuring the deal as a deposit.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1162, 1167 (7th Cir. 1988) (IPL II),
aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990).
The Seventh Circuit, however, seemed willing to accept this result. The court said, "[w]e
therefore hold that deposits to secure payment of an income item such as rent can be a distinct
category from advance payments for tax purposes." Id. at 1169-70 (emphasis added).
129. See supra note 15 (deposits that secure the payment of rent are considered advance rent).
130. 17 T.C. 1165 (1952).
131. Id. at 1169.
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months' rent and that the lease had been rewritten to make the deposit
refundable, in contrast to an earlier lease that had characterized it as
advance rent. 132 The court concluded that the deposit was income
because, "[f]or all practical purposes, the $28,000 was applied upon
rentals for the last few months of the lease term."' 133
Faced with a similar situation, however, the IPL III Court appeared
to give more weight to form than substance. The Court stated that a
customer's decision to apply a deposit to a current bill instead of tak-
ing a cash refund was really two steps instead of one.' 34 Thus, the two
steps could not be treated as one for tax purposes and the deposits
were not advance payments. In adopting this formalistic view, the
Court apparently foreclosed the ability of future courts to treat two
transactions as substantively one. If the parties' agreement says that
the deposit will be refunded upon payment of the last month's rent,
then presumably there are really two transactions and a court may not
combine them to find an advance payment of rent. This appears to
deprive courts of an effective way to police deposit agreements for
compliance with the intent of federal income tax laws.
However, this need not, and should not, be the interpretation given
to IPL III by future courts. In IPL III, the Court decided a case in
which the utility's customers unquestionably retained the right to can-
cel service at any time. The Court did not say that the exchange-of-
checks operation would also be conclusive in a case where the tax-
payer cast the deposit as "refundable" only to evade income tax prop-
erly payable. In fact, the Court expressly declined to make a rule for
such "hard" cases. 13  By admitting that in some cases parties may
attempt to disguise the nature of their bargains, the Court implicitly
acknowledged that where deposits are actually advance payments,
they should be treated as such. Future courts should, therefore, ele-
vate substance over form and hold that the IPL III rule does not apply
when a taxpayer receives a commitment to purchase goods or services
from a customer. This restriction of the Court's rule is appropriate to
ensure compliance with the spirit of the tax laws.
132. Id. at 1168-69.
133. Id. at 1169.
134. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
135. Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 110 S. Ct. 589, 595 (1990) (IPL III)
("We need not, and do not, attempt to devise a test for addressing those situations where the
nature of the parties' bargain is legitimately in dispute.").
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III. CONCLUSION
In Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (IPL III), the
United States Supreme Court held that because a taxpayer did not
have complete dominion over a deposit to secure payment of future
bills, the deposit should not be included in income when received.' 36
The test for dominion devised by the Court asks whether the taxpayer
has an obligation to repay the deposit and whether the customer
retains the right to cancel service at any time. If the answer to both
questions is yes, the deposit is not income and may be held tax-free by
the taxpayer. The IPL III test will allow taxpayers to exclude virtu-
ally all deposits from income because of the nature of most deposit
arrangements. Excluding the deposits from income was an appropri-
ate result on the facts of IPL III because it is not the purpose of fed-
eral income tax laws to tax receipts that the taxpayer has no assurance
of ever retaining. Future courts, however, should apply the IPL III
rule only to factually similar cases. When the obligation to repay is
not imposed by law or the customer has made a commitment to
purchase future services, courts should scrutinize the facts more
closely and apply the test to fit the substance of the transaction. In
cases where the obligation to repay is not fixed by statute or regula-
tion, courts should employ the factors traditionally used to identify a
loan to determine whether the taxpayer has incurred a bona fide obli-
gation to repay. Likewise, when a taxpayer receives a refundable
deposit to secure payment for future goods or services that its cus-
tomer has committed to purchase, courts should apply the rule of sub-
stance-over-form and hold that the deposit is taxable upon receipt as
an advance payment. These applications of the Court's test will best
balance the policy of taxing realized accessions to wealth against the
right to exclude from income receipts held subject to a genuine obliga-
tion to repay.
A lisa Eid
136. Id. at 596.
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